- 1 July 1996.
- 2 Up until now we have been in the process of doing
- 3 that, and also, based upon the 8 February signing of the
- 4 Telecommunications Act, those items and federal direction as
- 5 it relates to both interconnection and unbundling of network
- 6 elements and resale.
- We have proceeded, since we only have three
- 8 minutes, to go into a number of hearings. We have put out
- 9 interconnection rules on unbundled elements loops, rules
- 10 relating to resale. What we didn't anticipate from a
- 11 regulatory point of view was the complexity of operating
- 12 support systems.
- I want to just quickly show one chart, and I was
- told not to, but I think it will add to my comments. Well,
- 15 I won't. I guess they moved that. Well, that's funny when
- 16 you are sitting here.
- The points that we have had during our hearings is
- 18 naturally we by our current rules support nondiscriminatory
- 19 access to unbundled network elements which include the
- 20 Operating Support Systems. The problems that we have faced
- 21 during our hearings and through the workshops that we have
- had is how far does this go today based upon the
- technologies, and how much and who pays for what parts of
- this automation to ensure that there is this transparency
- for pre-ordering, ordering, maintenance and repair, as well

- 1 as billing procedures.
- The discussions that we have had within our
- 3 Commission have evolved around these particular points.
- 4 There is also, we have found, a misunderstanding upon both
- 5 parties, the CLECs as well as the ILEC. And in our case
- 6 that's US West, and I know there will be a later panel in
- 7 which US West will speak.
- But what I want to point out is the system that we
- 9 have available today is similar to what was discussed, a PC
- 10 with a Web browser interface that allows the CLECs to get
- into the provisioning of -- the pre-ordering functions of
- 12 the existing ILEC, in our case, US West. They can go in
- there, they can get that information. However, when it
- 14 comes to ordering, maintenance and repair and billing, these
- 15 issues will require manual interfaces, and that also I
- 16 should point out, has to do with the pre-ordering. As long
- as the order is filed correctly and the information is
- 18 correct, then it can be done -- that information can be
- 19 provided electronically.
- 20 But as far as the other interfaces, it's manual.
- 21 It's manual today, and we have been discussing with the
- 22 incumbent as to the time lines that they feel they will be
- able to modify those software applications to allow this
- 24 electronic interface. We are looking at possibly a year
- 25 from this past month.

1	Also, when we deal in the realities of what is the
2	impact, to date, as of Thursday of last week, the
3	competitive local access providers process within the State
4	of Colorado five orders. Throughout US West's territory, we
5	have no more than 200.
6	So we are in what I view as a learning process.
7	We support the automated interface. We want to see
8	transparency from a state commission point of view. We are
9	moving both the incumbent toward that goal, but we are also
10	trying to identify from the competitive local access
11	providers what are the exact requirements. And then
12	naturally when you talk just and reasonable, who pays for
13	these modifications to these softwares.
14	A final note, we are proponents of national
15	standards, our Commission, and with that I look forward to
16	the question and answer period.
17	Thank you very much.
18	MR. WELCH: Thank you, Commissioner.
19	Finally, we have two representatives from the
20	Executive Branch of the government, and first we will start
21	with Katheryn Brown from NTIA. Katheryn?
22	MS. BROWN: Thank you, Richard.
23	Thank you for the invitation to be here. NTIA, as
24	you know, on behalf of the administration has consistently
25	advocated practices and policies for robust competition in

- all of our markets. Our vision is that consumers will have
- 2 choice limited only by the constraints of the market to a
- yast array of telecommunication services from multiple
- 4 competitors.
- 5 Significant process has been made over these last
- 6 18 months to set the rules of the road, but without
- 7 operating systems in place that actually accomplish the kind
- 8 of interconnection contemplated by the Act, consumers will
- 9 lose, competitors will use, and I think incumbent companies
- 10 will lose as their customers become impatient with the
- market's inability to deliver the services they want.
- I offer three observations today which I think
- perhaps form a framework for the way we ought to look at
- this from a policy point of view.
- 15 First, the mark of real competition is that
- 16 consumers are able to change their providers with minimal
- 17 effort. This means that consumers can choose a new provider
- 18 with no delay, or minimal delay, with no loss of service,
- with no loss of billing, and with minimal confusion.
- 20 And I would suggest to the industry that these
- 21 standards should be set by the marketplace, by the consumer,
- and not decided amongst and between folks in a room who
- think that's what consumers want. There is a vast array of
- 24 consumer literature that talks about what consumers expect
- in a competitive marketplace, and I think it's well that all

- of us take a look at that. And when we are thinking about
- the standards we need to meet think about what the consumer
- 3 standard is.
- 4 Secondly, optimally the relationship between the
- 5 carriers should be a contractual one. We have to move
- 6 gradually away from a regulatory prescriptive approach to a
- 7 contractual approach. These contracts are supply contracts,
- 8 and our effort should be to ensure that we create an
- 9 environment that mirrors the commercial environment that any
- 10 other supply contract looks like.
- 11 This we need to do with all three kinds of
- interconnection that are contemplated by the Act. There
- should be contract language that covers not only the service
- 14 that is being provided -- my fear is that is much too narrow
- a focus. We know that there should be nondiscriminatory
- 16 access to all elements. That's taken for granted.
- 17 What we need is a contract that covers the
- 18 relationship of the parties. This should include
- 19 performance standards. What do the parties expect of each
- 20 other? And what clearly are the performance standards that
- one would expect under the contract?
- There should be service quality standards
- included, and there should be clear enforceable -- a
- 24 provision for enforceability of the contract. Commercial
- entities have found a way to resolve their own conflicts,

- and have placed value on the loss of time, the loss of
- 2 service that occurs when the contract is not fulfilled.
- 3 These should be part of the contracts between the carriers
- 4 and parties who are then serving consumers.
- 5 What then, three, is the role of government. The
- 6 role of government right now is to ensure that the
- 7 incentives are in place for the parties to reach contractual
- 8 agreement expeditiously, and to be able to deliver to
- 9 consumers the promise of this Act.
- There are a number of things on the record right
- 11 now, it seems to me, that are incentives for this kind of
- 12 behavior.
- First, it is entirely reasonable, in my view, that
- 14 state and federal regulators would require an
- interconnection agreement to include the kinds of elements
- that I just described. Without them the agreement doesn't
- 17 work.
- Secondly, it is entirely reasonable, in my view,
- 19 for regulators to think about these kind of agreements with
- 20 respect to all kinds of interconnection, whether it be a
- 21 resale kind of relationship or an unbundled element kind of
- 22 relationship.
- 23 It's reasonable also to conclude that the
- operating systems need to be, if not detailed in the
- 25 contractual language, at least contemplated and that some

- process for determining what those systems are and what the parties can agree on is in the contract with some date
- 3 certain.
- 4 NTIA has suggested that in the access charge
- 5 regime that the marketplace approach works only if there is
- a market, and we have suggested that if these operating
- 7 systems are not up and not reasonable, that the Commission
- 8 should go back and look at access charge levels. Inter-
- 9 ladder, it seems to me, becomes open then to the LECs once
- these systems are in place, and the market is in fact
- operating and customers have a choice.
- We further know that pricing flexibility is a
- available or should be available once there is a competitive
- 14 marketplace.
- These incentives are already in place under the
- 16 Act and should be embraced by regulators, both on the
- federal and state level, to ensure that the parties agree to
- 18 a win/win situation so that they can do business together.
- 19 Where those incentives are not apparent it seems to me we
- 20 need further discussion as to what the proper incentives are
- 21 to induce the parties to act reasonably and in accordance
- 22 with the Act.
- Bottom line, however, the law requires, requires
- interconnection, and puts a duty on carriers to ensure that
- 25 the systems are open. If the parties cannot agree in a

- 1 reasonable amount of time to the kinds of systems necessary
- 2 to ensure that consumers have real choice, then it is
- incumbent upon the state and federal regulators to step in.
- It is my view, however, that we will be better off
- 5 if the industry itself can come to consensus, and if the
- 6 environment is set properly so that it ends up a win/win for
- 7 the industry and a win for consumer.
- 8 Thank you.
- 9 MR. WELCH: Thank you, Katheryn.
- 10 And, finally, Don Russell, from the Department of
- 11 Justice.
- MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Richard.
- Since I am the last speaker, I will try to maybe
- sum up a couple of themes that I have heard through all of
- these opening comments by the other panelists, and also make
- a third point, which I think is implicit in what a lot of
- 17 people are saying.
- The first theme which I think comes through loud
- 19 and clear is that consumers in this country want and demand
- 20 very high quality competitively priced telephone service and
- 21 they won't tolerate anything less. And in order to get that
- from the new competitors that are coming into the
- 23 marketplace, those competitors will have to have high
- 24 quality, workable access to the electronic systems of the
- 25 incumbents, and have workable interfaces to coordinate their

activities and the activities of the incumbents that they
are working with.

It is absolutely clear that competition is to work on a significant scale, these interfaces have to be fully developed and working, and they have to work right, and they have to be affordable to all, and the consumers of this country simply won't tolerate anything less than that.

The second issue that I think is apparently from almost all the remarks we have heard this morning is the complexity of accomplishing this. The systems that are in place now are systems that were developed over many years time by the incumbents. They were developed with very large investments over many, many years by the incumbents. They work extremely well for the incumbents' own purposes, but it's going to be very difficult and costly and time consuming, to some extent, to make those systems available to the new competitors that are entering the marketplace and to make sure that adequate interfaces are developed and implemented to deal with the new competitive environment.

I think those two themes we have heard from all different perspectives this morning.

There is a third implication, I think, that comes out of that, which is that we should be thinking about these issues not as simply a one time issue, or a yes or a no issue, but more as an ongoing process that the industry will

- 1 be going through. I don't think the law requires absolute
- 2 perfection in terms of the interfaces that are developed. I
- don't think that's possible in this world.
- 4 On the other hand, I think it's important for
- 5 everybody to realize that the law also probably is not ever
- 6 going to reach the point where it says you have done enough
- 7 if you are the incumbent or if you are the competitor, and
- 8 you don't have to do anything more.
- The networks that are involved here, the
- interfaces between the companies are complicated today, but
- they will continue to evolve over a long period of time.
- 12 The kinds of business dealings between the new entrants and
- the incumbents will change over time. The technology will
- change over time, and the consumer demands in the
- 15 marketplace will be changing as well. And I think what that
- means is that in dealing with OSS issues, in dealing with
- 17 the interfaces between incumbents and the new entrants that
- 18 are competing against them, there will have to be a
- 19 continuing process by which these issues are worked out,
- 20 either with or without oversight by the FCC, with or without
- 21 private contractual arrangements through the industry
- 22 standard-setting bodies that we have heard from. But one
- 23 way or another this process is going to continue for quite a
- long time, and I think we will have to continue to strive to
- 25 making these systems work.

There has been, from our perspective, a tremendous
amount of progress that has been made over the last year or
so under the Telecommunications Act. There is also, I think
in many ways a tremendous road ahead of us, a long way to
go.
MR. WELCH: Thank you, Don.
Okay, now, we will move into the next phase, which
is some questions and answers, and hopefully we will
generate some wild debate among the panelists.
I want to thank everybody for keeping their
remarks brief. We are staying remarkably on time here.
The first area that we wanted to explore is the
role of government, the federal government in particular, in
this area of OSS. And Katheryn stole my thunder a little
bit with my first question. She has offered some views on
how she thinks this would develop.
So I'm going to ask her a couple more specific
questions along those lines, and then maybe we can hear from
some of the other panelists on the proper role of the
federal government and the FCC specifically.
Katheryn, you mentioned that basically the
position of NTIA is that consumer demand should drive this
process to the extent possible.
The first question is how do we as regulators or

people in the federal government know what that demand is?

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- 1 Is there a role for the government to be setting technical
- standards for these types of systems now? And should the
- 3 government be setting any type of performance standards now,
- 4 at least until competition develops? That is sort of three
- 5 questions there all at once.
- 6 MS. BROWN: Well, I should allow the industry to
- 7 talk about it because what I just suggested was that the
- 8 industry ought to step up to this issue, and ought to say
- 9 what is required for its customers.
- 10 I think that there is information out there. We
- in the regulatory field when I was in New York clearly had a
- 12 lot of information about what customers demanded with
- 13 respect to their company. Delay times, we knew what billing
- 14 was required, we knew what customers wanted with respect to
- 15 customer services, we knew what they wanted with respect to
- 16 technical service. We know what customers want. And I
- 17 believe the companies know what customers want. And I think
- we have to work from that point backwards.
- Do we need technical standards? Absolutely.
- Do we need standards, bodies to start talking
- 21 about what they are? Absolutely.
- 22 But we need performance standards that talk about
- outcomes, and that, in my view, should be what the companies
- 24 together are negotiating.
- 25 And my point is that government should be there to

- ensure that the negotiate those standards. They each and
- both have high need to push as far as they both can go. And
- 3 the best solution will be one that they both can live with
- 4 that will deliver to customers.
- 5 The trick, however, is when it is as complicated
- as this chart that the Commissioner wanted to show but
- 7 wasn't able to show, is who can decide all of those
- 8 individual details. And it seems to me that the parties are
- 9 in the best place to make those decisions, but they have to
- 10 do so expeditiously, and regulators have to demand that it
- 11 be done and done thoroughly.
- MR. WELCH: You mentioned the preference is to
- ensure that incentives are in place to get these into the
- 14 contractual arrangements, and the states in the first
- 15 instance are at the front line in working through the
- negotiated contracts and the arbitrations. And so I think
- 17 it would be useful to hear from the Commissioner about how
- 18 you are dealing with this in Colorado, and specifically, and
- maybe more generally, in the states.
- 20 COMMISSIONER MAJKOWSKI: As I started my comments
- off, we have been working this issue since '95, before the
- Telecommunications Act. And the way we tried to approach
- 23 this and I will bring it up to the complexity issue that I
- 24 talked about in our not understanding that as it relates to
- 25 OSS.

1	But when we started out to open up the local loop
2	to competition, we tried to touch on the easiest issues
3	first, so we touched on what we felt was local numbering
4	portability, E-911 access. Then we went into certification
5	of new entrants, transfer of those certifications cause they
6	meant money, and then what happens if someone wants to
7	abandon, who maintains responsibility for keeping the
8	customer connected to the public switch network.
9	From there we moved on to interconnection resale,
10	unbundling, unbundling elements, and the Colorado High Cost
11	Fund. With the Act as it came down, we were trying to get
12	the parties working together, all parties wireline,
13	wireless, competitive local access providers as well as the
14	CABS into the ball game so that we could get this
15	mutually agreed upon consensus building as to how we would
16	have what rules within the State of Colorado would allow
17	competition to take place on the first of July.
18	It also involved rates, and as specified, in
19	Colorado we had, in '96, House Bill 1010, which directed us
20	to put in rates in being. We did that by 1 July '96. US
21	West put the tariffs in.
22	Everything was in place except for the fact that
23	the incentives that Ms. Brown talks about still weren't
24	there. We went through the arbitration interconnection
25	agreements. We laid out standards. We laid out

performance. We had to pull the standards and performance 1 out of the interconnection agreements and address those separately because we couldn't get consensus on the part of 3 To which after awhile it became where -- in the parties. fact, in the case of AT&T and MCI and US West, where we did a ballpark to use your beginning comments, and picked and choose between the interconnection agreements as it relates to the entire programs, as well as quality of service. 8 You need quality of service standards. You need performance standards. You need to have within those 10 11 contracts, which I agree with, which are arbitrated 12 interconnection agreements, the ability to have the parties go to court. The Colorado Commission did not want to be 13 14 part of that ball game. We wanted to be outside of it. In fact, we started out with the arbitration of the 15 16 interconnection agreements. We told the parties that we 17 would prefer that they negotiate those agreements prior to 18 coming to us. But should they do that we will meet the 19 requirements of the law and finalize them, and we have done 20 that. 21 So I agree with the liability question, or the 22 enforcement question, but when it comes to the OSS the 23 reason why we didn't anticipate that was because of how do 24 you look at this complex thing of operating support systems, 25 and you have system management systems, and you had third

party data systems. All of these issues you had to have 1 open to the competitor so that they could compete, have access to that information. You want it on a real time 3 It's not there today, and it needs to be worked. basis. And that's where, in regards to the national 5 standards, my thoughts and comments would be you have got various RBOCs using the Legacy, Bell Corps. loose end 7 structure of their operating systems, and they have evolved 8 with proprietary information and networks in those systems 9 which each one of them has. 10 And so if you are going to do this on a national 11 12 scale and you're going to have competitive local access providers be able to complete on a national scale, they 13 14 shouldn't have to do it seven different times. That's it. 15 MR. WELCH: Maybe we could hear from the incumbents here for a second on this issue of incentives and 16 17 the proper role of government in terms of performance and 18 technical standards. 19 John, do you have any thoughts on that? 20 MR. LENAHAN: Sure. I think there is probably one 21 thing that Ameritech and LCI and MCI have in common, 22 probably a couple more than one things. But one thing that 23 we have in common is we both want to serve our customer and 24 make the customer happy. And the key to performance and

incentives, what I would call post-entry incentives, is that

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- there is a mechanism to measure the performance we are
- 2 providing to CLEC and compare it to the performance we
- 3 provide to our customers, because at the bottom line that's
- 4 going to be, I think, the most relevant measure as to
- 5 whether or not the CLEC is getting nondiscriminatory
- 6 service.
- 7 So I think there is a role for some minimum levels
- 8 of service quality that the government or the state or
- 9 federal regulators can help, but the real, I think, relevant
- measure of performance is a parity measurement which
- compares the CLEC and the ILEC on an apple to apple basis if
- 12 that's possible.
- So, in my opinion, the contracts that the
- 14 government needs to approve, the state commissions need to
- approve, the most productive role for government in that
- 16 case is to ensure that the contracts have adequate
- performance measurements, and adequate performance reporting
- obligations so that the parties can determine whether they
- 19 believe they are getting nondiscriminatory service relative
- 20 to the ILEC retail business and relative to the service the
- 21 ILEC is providing other competitive carriers.
- MR. WELCH: Maybe we could hear from a couple of
- 23 new entrants. What has been the experience thus far in
- 24 actually negotiating and arbitrating these contracts in
- terms of getting these types of performance or technical

- standards actually written into these contractual agreements?
- Don, do you have any thoughts on that?
- 4 MR. LYNCH: I have got a number of things I would
- 5 like to respond do.
- First off, I think a good start is starting with
- 7 the contracts. Clearly, we would like to have an
- 8 environment where you have commercial negotiations between
- 9 the parties to come up with a contract that's good for both
- parties, both the incumbent as with the new entrant.
- The fundamental problem you have you're starting
- off with a monopoly company and trying to have negotiations
- with, which basically says if you don't want it this way,
- 14 you don't need to do it at all.
- And then from three you may get to a commission,
- and a commission then has to try and to split the baby and
- 17 you end up not in a commercial environment that you would
- 18 normally like.
- 19 That also flows over in terms of setting the
- 20 standards. In every agreement that MCI has been trying to
- 21 get -- by the way, I am the guy who is supposed to get
- 22 them -- in every agreement that we have been trying to get
- we have consistently asked for standards of performance from
- 24 which we can measure the incumbent and the incumbent's
- 25 ability to provide services to us in which we in turn can

- 1 serve our customers.
- In most cases those performance standards have
- 3 been extremely difficult to negotiate. When they have been
- 4 arbitrated, they end up in state -- the state forums. They
- 5 get ordered down to the point that they are meaningless.
- 6 The last -- the further comment is that some folks
- 7 here have suggested that we want to maintain parity with the
- 8 RBOC. Clearly, that's the case. We want parity. But
- 9 that's not necessarily good in all cases. In some RBOC
- territories they have been fined recently for not providing
- 11 service to their own customers, and we certainly don't want
- our local customers to be subject to that types of problems.
- So to start off with, ideally in a commercial
- world, absolutely you want those kinds of terms and
- conditions in the agreement. From a practical standpoint
- given our starting point, it's near to impossible to
- 17 actually happen.
- To take a step further in terms of the systems.
- 19 For an incumbent, or rather, a new entrant trying to get
- into the business right now each of the RBOCs have come at
- 21 this issue in somewhat of a different way. We have talked
- 22 about GUI interfaces with PCs. That does not -- that cannot
- operate in a robust telecommunications market. All we need
- 24 to do is take a look in the long distance market and see the
- 25 robustness of it. We have millions of customers that decide

- that they want to change long distance carriers, and that
- 2 happens in some cases or most cases less than 24 hours.
- 3 Here, today, in the local market, it takes
- 4 multiplies of days and sometimes weeks to get our
- 5 transactions through.
- So we have enough standards sitting out there in
- 7 terms of a free competitive market, whether it be in the
- 8 long distance, and by the way, that also goes through the
- 9 maintenance systems, it goes through the billing systems.
- You have a model out there, and that's one of the things
- 11 that I would think that we need to replicate.
- 12 At this point in time I don't think we want any
- 13 federal or any -- any regulatory body coming in and setting
- 14 the standard per se. However, I would also say that I think
- the FCC and the state regulators have a stake in this as
- well as we do, and what I would mean by that is certainly
- helping us along the way, similarly to what was done in
- implementing 800 portability, in terms of an ongoing
- involvement, making certain that people were focused on the
- 20 end result, and using good offices to push this process
- 21 along, I think, can become very, very helpful with that.
- 22 Anne, I am sure you have got something to say.
- MS. BINGAMAN: Yes, I do.
- 24 First, as to the comments of Ameritech about
- parity being the goal, I endorse that wholeheartedly. Let

- 1 me echo Don's point that we are dealing here with entrenched
- 2 incumbents who have it all.
- Now, Ameritech today, I think, would have people
- 4 in the audience agree more incentive than most to be
- 5 cooperative, to help, to do everything they could to get
- 6 this thing on the road. And let me just tell you what's
- 7 actually happening out there.
- 8 Our bills are three to seven days late, daily
- 9 usage feeds. Our monthly usage feeds are anywhere from a
- 10 month to two weeks late. They are improving slowly.
- What this means is it is not close to parity.
- 12 They get theirs within 24 hours. We get our three to seven
- days or a month late, and you're billing an installation.
- 14 The customer doesn't know why, they have no idea. They
- think we are incompetent. We don't have the bills. That's
- 16 number one.
- 17 Number two, a simple thing, although it is
- 18 hellaciously complicated but simple to cure, but Ameritech
- 19 has met with basic indifference to our pleas to for God's
- sake help us with USOC codes. Now, let me just tell you
- 21 what UOSC codes are.
- They are basically Greek. They are strings of
- letters, and I brought some here for you just to give you
- 24 guys a little bit -- this is one page of one customer order,
- and these are USOC codes, and the read, "NALSA/DAD /6TLI/."

- 1 If you miss one letter in this entire page, your order is
- 2 rejected. These things are crucially important.
- 3 USOC codes were invented by Bell Corps. There are
- 4 10,000 of them. They differ for residential and business
- 5 consumers. PacBell will not give us USOC codes. Ameritech,
- 6 which wants parity, we have begged them to give us the same
- 7 USOC codes they have. For awhile they had them on a Web.
- 8 They took down the Web site for a month. They don't give us
- 9 the changes. We are in a world of hurt here, folks, on a
- 10 basic thing about how do you order this. This is
- 11 complicated stuff, and there is no English language
- 12 conversion to it.
- Let me give you another real simple example. Free
- 14 form customer service records come from Ameritech and every
- other RBOC electronically. Well, now, that sounds good.
- 16 It's electronic. Well, you know what free form is as
- opposed to fixed format. Fixed format is what they use for
- 18 themselves in billing. It's in fields. You know, computer
- 19 fields so that this field has this bit of information, the
- 20 next field has that bit. It's readable by your own
- 21 computer. You can write a routine.
- A free form customer service record, which is the
- 23 number one thing you need to find out what this customer
- 24 we're trying to sell to have and what is it. It comes in
- 25 this blop of lines, 80 lines on a page free form. We have

- to write sophisticated parsing routines to try to figure
- out, okay, is this the part of this that's the order. Is it
- 3 somewhere else in this line? And it's -- by the way, CSRs
- differ by region in Ameritech. Their CSRs aren't uniform.
- 5 You know, parity is great, and I am all for
- 6 parity, but we have been begging them for six months to help
- 7 us with this USOC thing, to give us fixed field, fixed
- 8 format. We are nowhere.
- And I am not trying to touch every single problem
- here, but I am trying to say to you dealing with an
- incumbent monopolist who has it all in complex computer
- systems, when you are struggling to get into business and
- you are trying desperately to just sell the line and not be
- in lawsuits is tough.
- Let me give you a second example. Bell Atlantic,
- 16 we have no deal today with Bell Atlantic. You know why? I
- have been telling them since February we want to get in Bell
- 18 Atlantic. It's the second biggest region for us. We are
- 19 crazy to get there. I have written Jim Young. I have
- 20 begged him. He said, "No problem."
- Okay, it's comes down to this. We got a deal on
- the simple resale and Bell South, to their credit, we did
- this in six hours with them; with Bell Atlantic, three
- 24 months of negotiating a simple resale contract. Okay, we
- are down to they want confidentiality on all performance

- standards. They want me to have to ask their permission to
- 2 give the FCC or the DOJ my views on performance standards so
- 3 that they can then seek a confidentiality order and put it
- 4 under seal.
- Well, now, what does that do the agencies, you
- know, who are passing on the adequacy of their performance?
- 7 It leaves you in a box. You are blinded.
- I have refused to sign that. I have offered to
- 9 sign the contract subject to my right to challenge that, and
- 10 I haven't heard back from them.
- So this idea that Kathy Brown, who his a dear
- friend and I respect her greatly, but the theory that we can
- negotiate in a normal business setting with monopolists when
- 14 we are facing desperate need to get in business and sell,
- the imperatives of that, plus the huge size of them versus
- 16 you, plus the relative importance of these things, what
- happens is it just doesn't work. This is not a normal
- 18 commercial setting. And I just -- to pretend, to pretend it
- 19 is and to pretend that this is just too business people
- trying to do business, let's face facts here.
- These people have a monopoly. They are business
- 22 people. They want to hang onto it. I don't blame them.
- 23 That's the nature of the world. You know, that's the thing
- 24 you are dealing with. We are trying to get in and we want
- 25 to get business. Their incentive is not to make it easy for

- 1 us to take their customers. Their incentive is to do as
- little as possible to get past the hurtles which will get
- 3 them into long distance, and then, you know, we will see
- 4 where we are.
- 5 The reason performance standards are so crucial to
- 6 be set by government is because we have heard the gentleman
- 7 from Colorado. You are aware of the Wisconsin staff, long
- 8 hearings on OSS, and a staff order denying Ameritech's
- 9 application. Illinois, the same. New York had a technical
- 10 conference on NYNEX. NYNEX agreed they had problems.
- 11 Georgia PSC found OSS problems.
- 12 What is going on right now in the states is what I
- really call a fire storm that is raging out there as people
- 14 struggle to grapple with these incredibly complex issues for
- 15 the first time. And you have staffs in state commissions
- 16 who are doing a conscientious job working at it, but they
- 17 need help.
- 18 I mean, I think the commissioner from Colorado
- 19 said it exactly, and that would be my view too. The
- 20 industry needs help from the FCC. Contract negotiations
- 21 will not do it.
- MR. WELCH: There has been a lot of talk about
- 23 parity. Let's explore the standards of parity and
- 24 nondiscrimination a little bit more. And, Don, I am
- 25 ultimately going to throw this question at you, so heads up.